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Book Review
CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS. By Marc I. Steinberg. Westport,
Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1983. Pp. vii, 294.
Marc I. Steinberg, former Special Projects Counsel of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and present
Associate Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School
of Law, has repolished several of his previously published articles
on an odd lot of issues of corporate management and responsibility
and titled the compilation Corporate Internal Affairs.1 The book
addresses seven topics: the SEC's influence on corporate internal
affairs; disclosure of information bearing on management integrity;
the use of special litigation committees to terminate derivative
suits; disclosure of corporate mismanagement; the duties of direc-
tors and management in tender offer contests; the business judg-
ment rule from a "corporate accountability" perspective; and the
role of inside counsel. This compendium is not useful as either an
academic tool nor as a timely guide to the practitioner on these
rapidly changing topics.' In fact, the aggregation of the articles is
without merit at all save to display in a concentrated fashion a
hodge podge of issues on how corporations are and should be man-
aged. The thought is that corporations and their managers must be
made more "accountable."
Corporations are legal entities, designed in a trust format, with
managers (directors and officers) as trustees, using the sharehold-
ers' invested capital for the sole purpose of making a profit in busi-
ness. For well-endowed corporations, the advantages of limited lia-
bility have decreased over time due to the corporations' sheer size,
and the legal and societal efforts to avoid the collapse of large enti-
ties employing large numbers or rendering an important service.'
Corporations serve as the primary legal entity for large enterprises
1. MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS (1983).
2. If information is sought on these topics, the reader is recommended to relevant law
review articles.




because the corporation's legal attributes permit it to organize vast
amounts of capital, to describe and evidence simply an investor's
interest, and to allow transfer of that interest in an easy and effec-
tive manner.
When the stockholder invests through purchase of shares, the
traditional philosophy is that he has invested with the notion that
the objective of the corporation is profit and that the managers are
legally (and, in a less rigorous sense, morally) constrained to oper-
ate its business and to manage the assets with that sole objective.
In addition, the stockholder might assume, unless the purpose
clauses of the articles of incorporation suggested otherwise, that
the objective and perception of the other stockholders are similar.
However, the increasingly accepted idea of "corporate accountabil-
ity" erodes the investors' ability to make those traditional assump-
tions. Under the accountability doctrine the corporation is re-
quired to be responsive, in some way not governed by the profit
motive tradition, to (shockingly) non-shareholders and to permit
some sects of shareholders, through methods other than obtaining
legal control of the corporation, to influence the corporation's man-
agers to act with some not-for-profit mores. This movement for ac-
countability may not be simply characterized as a change sought
by corporate law academics but, it is argued, the movement is
stockholder influenced, as well. Steinberg states:
Although a number of shareholders wish solely to maximize their invest-
ments, others have a strong concern that companies in which they have an
equity interest comply with certain minimal ethical or legal standards.. La-
beling such shareholders 'unreasonable' or such information 'unimportant'
discounts a corporation's accountability to its shareholders and to society in
general.4
Without legal question, the legislature can regulate the internal
affairs of corporations of all sizes in order to modify the traditional
rubric of profit motive and provide explicitly for broad accounta-
bility. Steinberg and many other thinkers view corporations as
powerful and impersonal agglomerations of capital, whose concen-
tration of wealth enables the manager to exercise unchecked influ-
ence in the community in which the corporation operates. He con-
cludes that such corporations must be operated with some
lodestone other than profit, i.e., some broader social accountability.
But, note carefully that Steinberg does not speak of criminal
matters as a guide to corporate accountability, although these
4. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 111.
1198 Vol. 22:1197
Book Review
cases are simpler. Rather, he speaks about ethical responses. While
I hesitate to call his philosophy fallacious, I recommend care in its
adoption. As Harold M. Williams stated in his thoughtful foreword
to Steinberg's book:
Periodic intervention of governmental, administrative and legislative bodies
is a predictable reaction to occurrences in the corporate sector that are not
acceptable to the public at large and to the body politic... [G]overnmental
intervention, as it occurs, threatens increasingly over time to so fetter
American business as to result, largely unintentionally, in the diminution of
the potential growth and viability of American business.'
The goal of the program of "corporate accountability" must be to
make America better (by, at least, some vague standard) and to
make American business better, i.e., more efficient and more prof-
itable. Tying this goal should be the demonstration that the quest
for increased accountability is not borne of misapprehensions of
the character of management, which would surely lead to the fet-
tering of enterprise. My concern is that attempting to raise the
level of ethical behavior of corporations and their officers through
legal obligations is an unwise approach. Success in legislating one
ethical perspective does not necessarily make America better.
For example, Steinberg believes that, under the appropriate trig-
gering mechanisms of security laws, management should be re-
quired to disclose information bearing on its integrity which, by
definition, has no material economic effect." The purpose of the
rule is to discourage such behavior, assuming that sinners will com-
mit fewer sins if they know their sins will be exposed to the appro-
bation of society. If Steinberg's rule is imposed and breached, what
is the remedy? Perhaps the invalidation of a stockholders' vote on
a corporate issue or the removal of a director, who may otherwise
be well disposed to the profit of the enterprise, on the motion of an
aggrieved minority of non-profit seeking shareholders. Consider
the choice of the remaining shareholders who, after the breach of
ethics has been disclosed, conclude that this issue of integrity has
no pitch and movement toward profit, which is their prime and
only motive for investment. Their faith in their ability to invest in
the corporation and to have their property managed traditionally,
for profit, is shaken and the enterprise is not better off save in the
vaguest of ethical terms.
Consider, for example, the issue of whether special litigation
5. Id. at viii.
6. Id. at 73-133.
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committees of boards of directors should be permitted to foreclose
actions commenced on behalf of the corporation by shareholders.
The issue arises from the ancient fiction of corporate law that cer-
tain actions belong to the corporation rather than the individual
shareholders because the corporation has been damaged as a whole
by the iniquity. The corporation should first decide whether the
action is appropriate, i.e., profitable to pursue. The irate share-
holder, before he can sue, will be required to demand that the di-
rectors consider the action. Of course, the shareholder argues that
such demand is futile because of collusion among the managers. To
avoid spurious litigation, special committees are formed, with vary-
ing degrees of disinterestedness and with the support of indepen-
dent professional counselors (independent of the usual crowd em-
ployed by the interested manager). These committees review the
evidence, determine that the matter is not worth the corporation's
trouble and may successfully apply to the court to dismiss the ac-
tion in order to avoid the charge of collusion. Steinberg presents a
lawyer-like review of this process and the creation of an effective
committee whose decision a court will not peek behind. He ap-
plauds, however, the instruction of the Delaware Supreme Court in
the leading case of Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,7 to review deci-
sions by these committees with "special consideration to matters of
law and public policy."8 Steinberg takes this instruction as a li-
cense to review the reasonableness of the committee's decision by
standards "transcend [ing] the sometimes narrow economic inter-
ests of the corporation and encompass[ing] principles of share-
holder welfare, public policy and, in essence, corporation account-
ability."9
Will the increase in derivative suits permitted by a more liberal
view of the derivative action enhance the effectiveness of the cor-
poration and society? The managers subject to such suits, if they
prevail may in some instances be indemnified or insured. In other
instances, if the damages are sufficient, the directors will not have
the wherewithal to recompense the corporation, thus rendering the
remedy hollow. Threat of such suits may increase the difficulty in
finding individuals to act as managers. But again, will judicial re-
view of corporate activity which might have significant community
effects,10 and which are tested by some standard other than
7. 430 A.2d 779 (1981). See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 147, 149-51.
8. 430 A.2d at 789. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 150.
9. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 154.
10. Community effects would include such occurrences as plant closings, layoffs, dives-
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whether such a move is profitable for the corporation and its
shareholders only, improve the quality of the service the corpora-
tion provides to society?
I do not mean to infer that the reforms suggested under the ban-
ner of corporate accountability are without merit. I only recom-
mend that analysis of such reforms goes beyond an assessment
that the ethical climate will be improved and that proponents
demonstrate some concrete improvement in the function of the
business enterprise which might be effected by such changes. The
vast majority of investors invest for their own profit. If a corpora-
tion begins to operate as an unprofitable facility because of com-
munity standards or community consideration or even by the will
of a minority of shareholders promoting such conduct, then inves-
tors will simply invest less or change the format of their
investment.
One of the reasons this frontier area of the law is fraught with
vagueness is because of the moral rather than legal aspects of the
issue.1 In framing the legal solutions, assumptions must be made
about the character of the managers of these enterprises. Steinberg
paints an ethical portrait of the manager which is not pretty-his
inclination to the immoral is directly related to his ability to con-
ceal the immorality; he is inclined, when tested, to place preserva-
tion of his job and the perquisites of his friends above the corpo-
rate interests; he belongs to a close-knit structure of managers who
are inbred, tied by religious, political and moral concepts, and who
look out for their own. In fairness, Steinberg does not condemn
them all but he does design solutions to problems which might
arise because of these perceived ethical failings. These solutions
are largely designed to force accountability through disclosure and
retribution. 12 A true raising of moral standards is not the objective
but rather a system which reins in the predilections of the manag-
ers to be unethical.
I am uncomfortable in accusing anyone that his morals are not
as good as mine. Nor do I believe that the law, as a matter of
course, should assume that man is a sinner. But, clearly, if Stein-
berg's perceptions concerning the character of these people is ac-
titures, relocations or acquisitions.
11. According to one commentator, "[t]he debate concerning ... 'corporate accounta-
bility' is a good example of this tendency to look for legal solutions to what have tradition-
ally been perceived as ethical questions." Williams, Corporate Accountability and the Law-
yer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 7, 9 (1978).
12. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 248-49.
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cepted, the law will impose such guarantees of corporate accounta-
bility. But, if that portrait is incorrect, which, I believe it is, then
the legal solutions proposed will not be effective and will have un-
intended results. As Williams wisely states "the best antidote...
is for corporations to take steps to assure the public that they are
capable of self-discipline which is consistent with both the realities
of the market place and the noneconomic aspects of the public
interest."' s
Mark D. Yochum
13. See Williams, supra note 11, at 9.
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